

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9377

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 7008

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: US PAPER ON AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS

REF: STATE 263866

1. NUMBER OF WG REPS COMMENTED ON US PAPER (REFTEL) AT DECEMBER 17 WG MEETING. CANADIAN REP (BECKETT) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES FOUND ANALYSIS EXCELLENT AND HELPFUL. HE NOTED REFERENCE IN SECTION IIA AOF PAPER TO POSSIBLE INCREASE IN CANADIAN AIR MANPOWER. HE SAID CANADA HAD GENERAL LONG - RANGE INTEREST IN KEEPING OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR FORCE RESTRUCTURING IN TERMS OF TRANSFERS BETWEEN SERVICES, BUT CANADA HAD NO PLANS FOR AIR MANPOWER INCREASE IN NGA.

2. IN LENGTHY PERSONAL ANALYSIS, BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PROPOSING US AND SOVIET AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT ADVANCE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN
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NEGOTIATIONS. HE THOUGHT SUCH PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE INEVITABLE AND DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIES IN PHASE II. HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTION IN BELGIAN AIR MANPOWER.

3. UK REP (GERAHTY) SAID LONDON FOUND US PAPER HELPFUL, CONSTRUCTIVE, AND WELL BALANCED. HE SUBMITTED FIVE QUESTIONS (TRANSMITTED BELOW) WHICH HE SAID WERE SYNTHESIS OF NUMBER OF QUESTIONS PAPER HAD ELICITED IN MOD. FRG REP (DZIALAS) SAID BONN REMAINED OPPOSED TO ANY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. HE EXPRESSED DOUBT WG HAD MANDATE TO CONSIDER THIS ISSUE. ACTING CHAIRMAN (SMITH) POINTED OUT SPC HAD ASKED WG TO CONSIDER ALL FIVE PROPOSALS ON AIR MANPOWER WHICH US HAD SUBMITTED. NETHERLANDS REP (VAN DER GRAAF) SAID AGUE APPRECIATED PAPER AND WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON IT LATER.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: BRIEF RESPONSES TO UK QUESTIONS IN TIME FOR JANUARY 14 WG MEETING.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF UK QUESTION:

QUESTION 1-- EFFECT ON SOVIET AIR FORCE

A. IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF SUB PARA IB (3), THE PAPER SAYS THAT " THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ALTERATION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE AREA WOULD BE REDUCED BY CONSTRAINING AIR MANPOWER." UK ENTIRELY AGREES WITH THIS STATEMENT, IN SO FAR AS THE NUMERICAL BALANCE OF AIRCRAFT IS CONCERNED. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD NECESSARILY STOP OR EVEN IMPEDE THE CURRENT PROGRAMME OF MODERNISATION AND THEREFORE CHANGES IN THE BALANCE IN TERMS OF COMBAT CAPABILITY. THERE APPEARS TO BE A POSSIBLE CONTRADICTION HERE BETWEEN THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE AND THE LAST SENTENCE OF SECTION IIIB. DOES US AGREE THAT FURTHER STUDY IS REQUIRED TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS ON THE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME (EVEN WITHOUT ANY " INCREASE OF INVENTORIES") OF A MANPOWER CEILING AT THE PRESENT LEVEL AND OF VARIOUS PERCENTAGE LEVELS OF REDUCTION?

B. THE US PAPER GIVES NO INDICATION OF THE EFFECT WHICH PERCENTAGE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD HAVE ON THE SOVIET AIR FORCE IN THE AREA. DOES THE US THINK THE EFFECT WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT OF SUCH CUTS ON USAF, GERMANY OR WOULD IT
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BE LIKELY TO RESULT IN SERIOUS CUTS IN THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE AIR CAPABILITY PRE- M DAY, AT ANY RATE AT THE 15 PCT LEVEL? COULD THE USSR TAKE SUCH CUTS IN THEIR SURFACE TO AIR DEFENCE UNITS OR IN HELICOPTER UNITS IN ORDER TO SPARE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY?

QUESTION 2--EFFECT ON US AIR FORCE, GERMANY

A. IN THIRD SENTENCE OF SECTION III C, THE PAPER SAYS THAT " THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE US AIR FORCE IN THE NGA WOULD PERMIT MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF UP TO 15 PCT WITHOUT REDUCING AIRCRAFT." PRESUMABLY THIS STATEMENT REFERS ONLY TO COMBAT AIRCRAFT, AS THE COMMENTARY ON THE 15 PCT REDUCTIONS OPTION INDICATES THAT " COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS SUCH AS

TACTICAL AIRLIFT" WOULD HAVE TO BE RE- DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE NGA.
WHAT DEGRADATION(IF ANY) WOULD SUCH RE-DEPLOYMENTS HAVE ON THE
SORTIE RATE OF THE 'M' DAY COMBAT AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED IN THE
NGA TO GIVE RISE TO THE PAPERS COMMENT THAT " OPERATINAL
FLEXIBILITY AND RADINESS WOULD BE REDUCED AT M-DAY"? WHAT
SORT OF DELAY(MEASURED IN DAYS) WOULD THE DEGRADATION OF
RECEPTION CAPABILITY IMPOSE ON THE ARRIVAL OF
REINFORCEMENT COMBAT CIRCUIT? HAS THE ASSESSMENT SET
OUT IN THE LAST TWO SUB PARAS OF THE PAPER BEEN MADE ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT WITHDRAWN US UNITS (EG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT)
WOULD BE RE-DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE NGA BUT STILL WITHIN EUROPE
OR THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE UNITED STATES?

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 7008

B. THE FOURTH PARA FROM THE END OF THE PAPER REFERS TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF CIVILIANSING BASE OPERATION SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
(UNDER 10PCT OPTION) AND OF MAKING GREATER USE OF CONTRACT
SUPPORT (UNDER 15 PCT OPTION). DOES THIS IMPLY THAT US AIR
MANPOWER REDUCED UNDER MBFR WOULD BE REPLACED BY CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL? IF SO, WOULD THIS NOT REPRESENT A CIRCUMVENTION
OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT CONCERNED?

C. WOULD IT BE PRUDENT TO MAKE AN OFFER FOR 15 PCT EQUAL
PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER TO THE USSR BEFORE
THE EFFECT ON USAF GERMANY FOLLOWING THE CONVERSION OF
SUPPORT FORCES TO COMBAT ASSIGNMENTS (SEE SECTION III C)
IS KNOWN?

QUESTION 3- COMPOSITION OF REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I

3. THE U.S. EARLIER PROPOSED THE WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 15 PCT OF US AND SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I. THIS PAPER ON THE SECRET

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OTHER HAND SAYS THAT "THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A LIMITED DISCUSSION OF THE COMPOSITION OF ITS REDUCTIONS AND COULD INCLUDE SOME US AIR MANPOWER IN OUR TOTAL REDUCTIONS IN RETURN FOR ASYMETRICAL SOVIET MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS INCORPORATING A TANK ARMY." DOES THIS MEAN THAT US REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WOULD TOTAL ONLY 29,000 MADE UP OF AIR AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, OR 29,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL PLUS WHATEVER AIR MANPOWER REDUCTION FIGURE IS DECIDED UPON? IF IT IS THE LATTER, AND IF EQUAL PERCENTAGE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER EFFECT ON SOVIET AIR CAPABILITY THAN ON THE USAF, HAS THE US CONSIDERED THE OPTION OF USING THE AIR POWER, THEY CAN AFFORD THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NGA, AS A MIXED PACKAGE TYPE MAKE-WEIGHT TO HELP BUY SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ASYMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT DEMANDING SOVIET AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN RETURN?

QUESTION 4-LINK WITH OPTION III

A. SECTION III C STATES THAT "IF A SEPARATE DECISION WERE MADE TO REDUCE CURRENT AIRCRAFT LEVELS, ALONG THE LINES OF OPTION III, WE (THE US) WOULD EXPECT TO COUNT THE ASSOCIATED MANPOWER". COULD THE US PLEASE SAY WHETHER THE OPTION III AIRM MANPOWER (1500 MEN) WOULD BE ADDITIONAL TO THE 3,400 AIRMEN OR 5,100 AIRMEN WHO WOULD BE REDUCED UNDER THE 10 PCT OR 15 PCT OPTIONS OR CONTAINED WITHIN THOSE FIGURES?

B. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE STATEMENT IN THIRD PARA FROM END OF PAPER THAT UNDER THE 15 PCT OPTION "REMOVAL OF AIR FORCE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CAPABILITY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE PACKAGE." DOES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MEAN DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (IE OPTION III) OR SOMETHING DIFFERENT?

QUESTION 5-LINK WITH THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT

PENULTIMATE PARA OF SECTION II A SAYS THAT "WESTERN AGREEMENT TO INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING COULD BE CONDITIONAL ON EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING". WHAT DOES THE US MEAN BY THE WORD "CONCEPT"? IS IT AGREEMENT TO THE GENERAL IDEA OF HAVING A COMMON CEILING AT SOME UNDEFINED SECRET

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FIGURE WHICH COULD BE SET AT A LATER DATE, EG. AT THE CURRENT

LEVEL OF NATO FORCE STRENGTH IN THE AREA AT THE END OF PHASE I,
OR IS IT AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING AT SOME DEFINED LEVEL
(EG AT ABOUT 900,000 MEN)?
END TEXT.
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